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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

THE ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS OF “CLINICAL INTEGRATION:”
AN ANALYSIS OF FTC STAFF’S ADVISORY OPINION TO
MEDSOUTH

THOMAS B. LEARY*
This Article will focus on a single fourteen-page letter from an Assistant
Director in the Federal Trade Commission’s (hereinafter referred to as
“Commission”) Bureau of Competition to a law firm in Washington, D.C., in
response to that law firm’s request for an advisory opinion on a business
proposal.1 MedSouth, Inc., a physician independent practice association,
located in Denver, Colorado, proposed to integrate partially the practices of its
members and to negotiate for their services collectively with payors. Counsel
for the association wanted to know whether Commission staff would
recommend an antitrust challenge. Staff advised that it would not recommend
a challenge, but that it would monitor future developments.2
The resulting staff opinion is worthy of study for a number of reasons.
First, the opinion provides a useful discussion of general antitrust principles
applicable to joint ventures. Second, it is the first opinion that applies the socalled “clinical integration” test under the joint DOJ/FTC Statements of
Antitrust Enforcement Policy in Health Care.3 Third, if the MedSouth
experiment succeeds, it could have a profound effect on the future evolution of
managed care.

* Commissioner, Federal Trade Commission. This article is an expanded version of a speech
delivered at the Saint Louis University Health Law Symposium on April 12, 2002. The views
expressed are individual, and not necessarily shared by other Commissioners. I acknowledge the
assistance of my advisor, Holly L. Vedova.
1. Letter from Jeffrey W. Brennan, Assistant Director, Health Care Services & Products,
FTC, to John J. Miles, Ober, Kaler, Grimes & Shriver (February 19, 2002), at http://www.ftc.gov/
bcadops/medsouth.htm [hereinafter MedSouth Staff Opinion]. The Commission’s advisory
opinion process allows interested parties to request advice from the Commission with respect to a
course of action that the requesting party proposes to pursue. In practice, most advisory opinions
are staff letters. The Commission’s advisory opinion procedure is contained in 16 C.F.R. §§ 1.11.4 (1993).
2. MedSouth Staff Opinion, supra note 1.
3. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, STATEMENTS OF ANTITRUST
ENFORCEMENT POLICY IN HEALTH CARE (1996), reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶13,153,
at §§ (8)(B)-(C) (Sept. 5, 1996) [hereinafter HEALTH CARE STATEMENTS]. A number of previous
opinions have discussed “financial integration.”
223
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The article will discuss the background, the rationale and the implications
of this opinion letter, with consideration of complicating factors.
I. BACKGROUND SETTING
A.

Special Economic Factors

The antitrust analysis of a joint venture proposed by health care providers
must take account of the special characteristics of the marketplace in which
they operate. Most notable is the fact that people who seek medical treatment
normally do not directly and individually pay for the full cost of the treatment.
They may pay a great deal for health care, indirectly and collectively through
insurance premiums and taxes, but these payments are not associated with
particular services. The incremental costs of the services to insured patients
may be close to zero. This means that these people tend to “over-consume”
health care services.4
Health care providers (like doctors) have a corresponding incentive to
“over-supply” some services, to the extent they are paid for each procedure or
test that they supply.5 This tendency to “over-supply” will not be disciplined
by patients, who have neither the specialized knowledge to recognize it, nor
the incentive to do anything about it. Someone has to perform a gatekeeper
function to moderate these mutually reinforcing tendencies to over-supply and
to over-consume.
In countries with socialized medicine, the gates are tended by the state and
care is rationed by a queue; in the United States, the gates are tended by private
entities like Health Maintenance Organizations (“HMOs”) and care is rationed
according to their guidelines. Neither system is popular.
The basic problem is that people can comprehend the need to reduce health
care expenditures in the aggregate, and recognize that some gatekeeping is
necessary, but we all tend to assign an almost infinite value to the life of any
identifiable person. There will always be individual horror stories, where
public or private gatekeepers appear to have acted callously, and no group is
more outraged by these incidents than people in the provider community—who
have firsthand experience with many of them and a powerful ethical
commitment to individuals in their care.
These providers have a legitimate incentive to engage in collective action
that will increase their bargaining power on issues that relate to the quality of
care. The problem is that, like any other group, providers also have a less
legitimate incentive to engage in collective action that will increase their own
4. See, e.g., David M. Cutler, A Guide to Health Care Reform, 8 J. ECON. PERSP. 13
(1994).
5. Doctors may also be tempted to practice “defensive medicine” (that is, excessive tests
and procedures) to reduce the risk of malpractice claims. Id. at 16.
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income.6 The challenge for antitrust is to distinguish between collective
conduct that primarily addresses a legitimate objective and conduct that does
not, recognizing there may be spillover effects and the future is always
uncertain. This is not just a technical legal problem because an antitrust policy
that is perceived to be overly aggressive is likely to be tempered by a strong
political response.7
B.

General Antitrust Principles

The applicable legal standards also contain some internal anomalies.
Virtually all antitrust cases involve the activities of a number of people, but it
makes a significant difference in the analysis if these activities are deemed to
be the work of a single entity or a combination of separate entities. The critical
question is whether there is or is not an “efficiency-enhancing integration of
economic activity.”8 The anomaly is that the distinction between the two
categories can involve some close judgements up-front,9 but thereafter the
analysis proceeds in a very different way. As a practical matter, these delicate
up-front distinctions may ultimately be outcome determinative.
Specifically, a group of doctors can probably negotiate collectively with
payers about payment terms if they meet the criteria for treatment as a single
entity, but they are guilty of a per se antitrust violation if they do not meet the
criteria.10 Before considering this issue in greater depth, it is necessary to look
at the substance of the MedSouth proposal.
II. THE MEDSOUTH FACTS AND THE STAFF OPINION
MedSouth, Inc. is an independent practice association in Denver,
Colorado, that currently includes about 450 doctors who practice in the fields
of primary care and forty specialties and sub-specialties. This group of doctors
proposes to coordinate activities by sharing clinical information; coordinating

6. See FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411 (1990).
7. See Warren S. Grimes, The Sherman Act’s Unintended Bias Against Lilliputians: Small
Players’ Collective Action as a Counter to Relational Market Power, 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 195,
212-13 (2001); John J. Miles, Joint Venture Analysis and Provider—Controlled Health Care
Networks, 66 ANTITRUST L.J. 127, 152 (1997).
8. See FED. TRADE COMM’N & U. S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR
COLLABORATIONS AMONG COMPETITORS (2000), reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶
13,161, at § 1.2 (Apr. 12, 2000) [hereinafter COLLABORATION GUIDELINES].
9. Cf. Fraser v. Major League Soccer, L.L.C., 284 F.3d 47, 59 (1st Cir. 2002) (“Once one
goes beyond the classic single enterprise . . . it is difficult to find an easy stopping point or even
decide on the proper functional criteria for hybrid cases.”).
10. See, e.g., Obstetrics and Gynecology Med. Corp. of Napa Valley, No. C-4048, 2002 WL
1005063 (FTC May 14, 2002); Physician Integrated Serv. of Denver, Inc., No. 0110173, 2002
WL 988023 (FTC May 14, 2002); Aurora Associated Primary Care Physicians, L.L.C., No.
0110174, 2002 WL 988024 (FTC May 14, 2002).
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treatment, particularly the interface between primary care doctors and
specialists; developing practice protocols; and monitoring the compliance of
individuals in the group. The stated objectives are to improve patient
outcomes, decrease use of physician resources and provide MedSouth with a
competitive advantage over other practices in the area.
Prices for treatment will be collectively negotiated with payers, but doctors
will bill individually and directly on a fee-for-service basis. MedSouth will not
negotiate capitated contracts or share profits of a joint enterprise. However,
the venture will be non-exclusive, and members can contract individually with
payers who do not choose to negotiate with the group.
In response to MedSouth’s request for an advisory opinion, FTC staff
followed the analytical process described above in Section I.B. and concluded
that a “per se analysis would not be appropriate in evaluating MedSouth’s
proposed course of conduct.”11 The rationale for this conclusion was that the
proposed plan “appears to involve partial integration among MedSouth
physicians that has the potential to increase the quality and reduce the cost of
medical care.”12 In addition, the staff opined that the proposed “joint
contracting appears to be sufficiently related to, and reasonably necessary for,
the achievement of the potential benefits to be regarded as ancillary to the
operation of the venture.”13
The integration rationale is specifically addressed in the Health Care
Statements and there have been a substantial number of previous staff opinions
to the same effect.14 However, the previous opinions were based on a
prediction that financial risk sharing would provide the incentives for the
achievement of substantial efficiencies.15 In MedSouth, for the first time, the
opinion addressed a venture with no (or trivial) financial risk sharing and relied
on so-called “clinical integration” to yield the expected efficiencies.16 Note
that the underlying justification for a “financial integration” and a “clinical
integration” test is similar (potential for improved efficiencies), but the former
seems to rely on the existence of incentives to improve whereas the latter
seems to rely on the stated plans for improvement.
The staff opinion’s further conclusion that joint contracting with payers
should be treated as an ancillary restriction will be discussed below. The
bottom line is that this finding, along with the application of a clinical
integration test, justifies a rule-of-reason analysis of the venture. In my view,
this conclusion is consistent with the Commission’s own guidelines and policy
11. MedSouth Staff Opinion, supra note 1.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. A list of health care antitrust advisory opinions by Commission and staff is available at
http://www.ftc.gov/bc/advisory.htm (last visited Aug. 29, 2002).
15. See HEALTH CARE STATEMENTS, supra note 3, at § (8)(A)(4).
16. See id. at § (8)(B).
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statements, and mandated by applicable case law.17 The difficult issue that the
opinion does not tackle is precisely how a subsequent rule-of-reason inquiry
would proceed. Discussion of this issue would be speculative because the
venture was only in the proposal stage and because there have been no
subsequent rule-of-reason challenges to ventures that were given comparable
comfort. There was no particular need for staff to embark on this speculative
exercise, but that is what this article will now attempt to do.
III. CONCEPTUAL PROBLEMS IN A TWO-STEP ANALYSIS
There is something anomalous about the whole idea of a “two-step”
analysis that involves, first, a determination whether rule-of-reason treatment is
appropriate and, second, an analysis under the rule of reason. One problem is
that it may be necessary to look at some aspects of “reasonableness” in the first
step, as well. The MedSouth opinion letter, for example, refers to the
efficiency-enhancing “potential” of the proposed venture, which requires the
exercise of some judgment, and then goes on to find that joint contracting
“appears to be sufficiently related . . . and reasonably necessary.”18 Factual
judgment is needed to support a conclusion that a fuller examination of the
facts is necessary.
This seemingly awkward process is not unique. For example, a tying case
requires an initial inquiry into factual issues like market power and product
definition before deciding whether per se or rule-of-reason treatment is
appropriate.19 Similarly, the National Cooperative Research and Production
Act provides that certain joint ventures qualify for rule-of-reason treatment,20
but the statutory definition excludes those ventures that will exchange sensitive
information “not reasonably required to carry out the purpose of the venture.”21
A reasonableness test to determine whether to apply the rule-of-reason
raises interesting questions in the context of a nascent venture like MedSouth,
when no one knows whether certain assumptions will prove to be true. What
happens if some plans for clinical integration are not carried out or predicted
quality improvements do not materialize? As a matter of strict logic the
venture should be deemed per se illegal—perhaps even retroactively. Since
findings of per se illegality can have serious collateral consequences, this
appears to be a harsh sanction for failure to fulfill a business plan. On the
other hand, if the consequences are not serious, there may be a perverse
incentive for ventures to promise innovations that they have no intention of
implementing. It may be that the best option in this hypothetical circumstance

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

See Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756 (1999).
MedSouth Staff Opinion, supra note 1.
See, e.g., Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984).
15 U.S.C. §§ 4301-05 (2000).
Id. § 4301(b)(1).
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would be to simply withdraw the opinion letter in light of changed
circumstances, and, thereafter, the venture would be subject to per se
condemnation if it did not modify its behavior.
There is another awkward feature of a two-step analysis. Regardless of the
verbal formulation, I am not sure the human mind is capable of reasoning in so
disciplined a way—at least, when it is necessary to take the two steps in close
sequence. A decision-maker cannot help forming an overall impression and
this sense of the ultimate destination may affect an analysis in step I. Actually,
the impression could cut either way; a decision-maker might be particularly
generous to the venture in step I, knowing that it would fail the analysis in step
II. Thus, the law on the distinctions between per se and rule-of-reason
offenses could be subtly distorted.
This anomaly is less problematic when, as here, the step I analysis in the
MedSouth opinion will be separated in time from a full inquiry that might be
conducted down the road. When deciding step I, staff did not have any sense
of how the facts, relevant in a step II inquiry, would play out.22 As will
become clear from the discussion below, however, these issues will not go
away entirely if there are later proceedings because step II also involves a
number of individual steps.
IV. ANALYSIS UNDER THE RULE-OF-REASON IN STEP II
Once it is determined in step I that rule-of-reason treatment is appropriate,
the decision-maker in most cases will move promptly to step II, the actual ruleof-reason analysis. In cases like MedSouth, where step I has been completed
before the venture is even up and running, the step II analysis may be separated
by a period of years, if it is undertaken at all. Nevertheless, it may be useful to
examine some of the issues that would arise in a step II inquiry into a venture
like MedSouth, because such an inquiry is bound to occur in the future.
The general framework for a step II rule-of-reason inquiry is set out in the
Collaboration Guidelines.23 This inquiry may itself proceed in a stepwise
fashion. The first step typically will involve market definition and calculation
of market shares. If the market shares are low enough, the inquiry can stop at
this point. (For physician joint ventures specifically, market share “safety
zones” of twenty percent for exclusive ventures, and thirty percent for nonexclusive ventures, are specified in the separate Health Care Policy

22. For similar reasons, I do not believe it is all that difficult for a Federal Trade
Commissioner to distinguish between a “reason-to-believe” that a complaint should issue and a
later determination on the merits. However, I do believe that existing case law on the “reason-tobelieve” standard is not particularly helpful—a subject for a different paper.
23. COLLABORATION GUIDELINES, supra note 8, at §§ 1.2, 3.3; HEALTH CARE
STATEMENTS, supra note 3, at § (8)(B)(2) (requiring a similar four step approach).
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Statements.)24 If further inquiry is needed, the second step will be to “examine
whether the relevant agreement is reasonably necessary to achieve
procompetitive benefits that likely would offset anticompetitive harms.”25
Note that this formulation combines elements that are sometimes expressed
separately as two additional steps: one is the balance of likely anticompetitive
harm and procompetitive benefits, and another is the issue of whether a less
restrictive alternative is available.26
Each of these two (or three) steps in the rule-of-reason analysis will raise
interesting issues in the context of a venture like MedSouth. The discussion
below will be organized as if there were three steps.
A.

Markets and Market Shares

The apparent “market share” of a venture like Medsouth obviously
depends on the geographic area considered and how the various specialties are
broken down. The staff opinion letter did not attempt a rigorous analysis of
this issues, but instead referred to some worst-case shares as illustrations (for
example, the letter states: “In a number of specialties, they [MedSouth]
constitute half or more of the physicians with admitting privileges at the three
hospitals in south Denver.”).27
A rigorous analysis was not deemed necessary for a step I decision on
whether to apply a per se or a rule-of-reason test. But what would happen if
the shares had been substantially different? If the shares were lower, the
venture might fall within a “safety zone” or require only a cursory analysis for
approval.28 The outcome in the converse situation is less clear because there is
no express upper-limit “danger zone” that balances the lower limit safety zones
in the Health Care Statements. At very high percentages, it could be difficult
to overcome a strong market-share presumption in a step II rule-of-reason
inquiry,29 and it would be appropriate for a hypothetical opinion letter to
highlight this caveat.
There are other potential difficulties in a complete analysis that the opinion
letter did not need to address such as, “How do you measure the ‘market share’

24. HEALTH CARE STATEMENTS, supra note 3, at § (8)(A).
25. COLLABORATION GUIDELINES, supra note 8, at § 3.3.
26. See 1 ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 75-76 (5th
ed. 2002).
27. MedSouth Staff Opinion, supra note 1.
28. See HEALTH CARE STATEMENTS, supra note 3, at §§ (8)(A), (8)(B)(4).
29. The examples of high-share ventures in Health Care Statements impliedly suggest that
collective negotiation of fee-for-service rates would be problematic. See HEALTH CARE
STATEMENTS, supra note 3, at §§ (8)(C)(6)-(7). See also Thomas B. Leary, An Inside Look at the
Heinz Case, ANTITRUST, Spring 2002, at 32 (discussing the formidable hurdles that face parties
who propose 3-2 or 2-1 mergers).
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of a physicians’ association anyway?” and “What is the significance of either a
growing or declining share?”
The opinion letter estimated “shares” based on the number of doctors in
various specialties affiliated with the venture divided by the total number of
doctors in these specialties in the appropriate geographic region. Leaving
aside the problem of defining the geographic market—a complex issue with
lore and learning of its own30—there is a question whether it is useful to assign
shares by counting doctors. If there are qualitative differences between the
doctors in the venture and those outside (and there well might be if the clinical
integration is successful) shares measured by headcount do not accurately
reflect the real competitive significance of the venture.
Another problem is a headcount measure may make it more difficult to
decide an ultimate issue in the case. An ultimate issue is whether a particular
venture has either a history of, or a potential ability to, reducing output and
increasing prices. In the usual case, the number used to compute a market
share (units or dollars, as appropriate) is also a measure of output, but that is
not the case here. You cannot measure the output of a venture like MedSouth
by counting doctors. In fact, as will be discussed below, you probably cannot
just count tests or procedures performed.
The incongruity of a headcount tally is highlighted by one aspect of the
Staff Opinion that may be troublesome down the road. The opinion seems to
draw comfort from the fact that “MedSouth expects that . . . it will represent
fewer physicians in negotiations with payers than currently are members.”31 A
prediction that members will drift away runs contrary to another prediction that
provides the justification for rule-of-reason treatment, namely, the expectation
that clinical integration will result in better care and “provide MedSouth with a
competitive advantage.”32 You would think the venture would attract more
members and grow larger if this prediction held true. After all, the success of
any enterprise is frequently measured by its growth or “market acceptance.”
On the other hand, there could be a less benign explanation for an increase in
membership—doctors might be attracted to the venture simply because they
want to be able to bargain collectively.
Note also that if the venture succeeds, its members will presumably
acquire knowledge of superior diagnostic and treatment methods, and some of
that knowledge will be portable. If these members drift away, there will be an
30. Cf. Gregory Vistnes, Hospitals, Mergers, and Two-Stage Competition, 67 ANTITRUST
L.J. 671, 685-92 (2000). The article discusses the difficulties of defining geographic market, and
in particular, the use of patient-flow data, in the context of hospital mergers. The analysis of the
proper “market” for a physician’s venture might be done in a similar way, and the challenges
could be even greater with physicians, whose offices can be spread out over a large geographic
area. Id.
31. MedSouth Staff Opinion, supra note 1.
32. Id.
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ever-increasing “free-rider” problem that could ultimately reduce incentives
for continued improvement. So, the prospect of a reduced “market share,”
however measured, is here an ambiguous fact. There are more such
ambiguous facts.
B.

The Attainment of Efficiencies

It is one thing to decide that a proposed business plan facially holds
promise to satisfy a “clinical integration” requirement. The prediction may be
hazy, but the predicted effects of “financial integration” are just as hazy, and
the FTC’s own guidelines make a decision unavoidable. But, when the time
comes, how does a finder of fact decide whether the efficiencies have
outweighed the anticompetitive effects of collective action?
As stated above, the ultimate question is whether the venture has raised
prices and reduced output. In the usual case, the two have a reciprocal
relationship but, at least, they can be separately identified. The relevant
numbers are the units produced and the price per unit. The situation here is
more muddled.
The difficulty of measuring output by counting doctors has been discussed
above. Suppose, hypothetically, that instead of measuring output by counting
doctors, output was measured by the number of tests and procedures performed
by individual doctors. The trouble with this measure is that the unusual
economics of health care creates incentives for the oversupply of these
services,33 and a reduction could well be an indication that the venture has
improved the quality of patient care or the health of patients. Better informed
and more confident doctors may be able to diagnose with fewer tests and better
preventive care may result in fewer procedures. The apparent “output”
reduction could be an efficiency, which suggests the need for some quality
adjustments, at the least, or perhaps a more fundamental reorientation to view
the quantum of services rendered as an input rather than an output.
Given the problems in measuring output, suppose a fact finder were to
focus directly on prices. The issues here could also be equally difficult. The
Commission encountered situations where there was a relatively rapid increase
in the price of a venture’s services that was obviously attributable to an
increase in collective bargaining power rather than improved quality.34 These
cases are easy. But, what if prices changed slowly over time and there is
evidence the venture implemented innovative programs to provide better care?
In these situations, the fact the per-capita income of the association
members has increased, or the prices per test or procedure has increased, may
not prove the exercise of market power. Wholly apart from the quality
33. See discussion supra Section I.A.
34. See, e.g., Tex. Surgeons, P.A., No. C-3944, 2000 WL 66997 (FTC May 18, 2000); Wis.
Chiropractic Ass’n., No. C-3942, 2000 WL 670031 (FTC May 18, 2000).
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dimension, prices could be increasing across the board. Even if the market
worked efficiently, this would not be surprising—people in an increasingly
affluent society might be expected to spend larger amounts of discretionary
income on health care, and thereby increase demand. Then, there are the
difficult quality issues discussed above. Payers may be willing to pay
MedSouth doctors more money for fewer services simply because these
doctors are better at deciding when services are necessary and get better results
when they perform those services.
Suppose you were to assume that the “service” the doctors are selling is
not the provision of tests and procedures, but rather better health? How do you
put a price on that? One proxy might be the amount of money that people have
to spend on health care. Over the long run, healthier people may require less
medical attention, so the total costs per patient may decrease if the venture
delivers superior care. But, costs may increase in the short run with heavier
reliance on preventive care. And, of course, healthier people may still incur
higher costs in the long run if they live longer. At this point, heads begin to
spin and it may be tempting to fall back on the traditional “market test” of
increased consumer acceptance, demonstrated by increased market share. This
could indicate that the overall price-quality package of the group is appealing.
However, as mentioned above, it could also mean association membership has
grown because of the perceived advantages of collective bargaining.
One way to avoid these ambiguities would be to focus instead on the
elements of the association’s business plan and examine whether the members
have done what they promised to do. At least, this might help to sort out the
extreme cases. This test might show, on the one hand, that the promised
“clinical integration” was simply a pretext to avoid per se condemnation. At
the opposite pole, the test might show the group has followed its plan with
enthusiasm and has achieved widespread professional and customer approval.
It is not unusual to rely on such opinion evidence when evaluating various
business proposals.35 The tough cases, of course, will lie in the middle. We
need to recognize that doctors, like other providers of goods and services, may
have mixed incentives both to improve their efficiency and their collective
bargaining power.36

35. See David Scheffman, Director, Bureau of Economics, Federal Trade Commission,
Sources of Information and Evidence in Merger Investigations, Address Before the ABA Section
of Antitrust Law and the Association of the City of New York (June 14, 2002), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/other/scheffmanabanycbar.pdf.
36. See HEALTH CARE STATEMENTS, supra note 3, at § 8(B)(2).
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C. Less Restrictive Alternatives
A key finding in the staff opinion is the conclusion that joint contracting
was closely related and essential to the success of the venture.37 This may be
true in the sense that neither MedSouth nor other similar associations are likely
to embark on such a promising experiment absent assurance they can bargain
with payers as a group. Another important element of the opinion is the
finding that the venture will be non-exclusive. This is not at all surprising. It
is standard antitrust doctrine that non-exclusive ventures are viewed more
benignly than exclusive ventures.38 There is, however, an unacknowledged
tension between the opinion’s findings on joint contracting and its reliance on
non-exclusivity.
The opinion advances two rationales in support of joint contracting. First,
it is asserted that “doctors need to be able to rely on the participation of other
members of the group in the network and its activities on a continuing basis,”
and joint contracting will assure this “continuing participation.”39 Joint
contracting will surely reinforce this assurance, but non-exclusivity will surely
undercut it. Lawyers are familiar with this notion, too, as most law firms
mandate exclusivity partly to assure availability.
The opinion’s second rationale for joint contracting is that it will assure a
more “equitable” distribution of returns among the members of the venture.40
Again, this is surely important—if a few opportunistic prima donnas parlay the
superior skills they acquire inside the venture to bargain for extraordinarily
high individual fees, they not only “free ride” on the work of their colleagues,
but detract from the customer appeal of the venture overall. But, if these same
prima donnas are free to contract on their own for high fees outside the
venture, they also take a free ride and, of course, these outside engagements
would tend to reduce their availability.
In short, if joint bargaining is necessary, how can the venture tolerate nonexclusivity? Alternatively, if non-exclusivity is tolerable, what does this say
about the need for joint bargaining? It is entirely possible that some ventures
like MedSouth will turn out to be substantially exclusive de facto, if not wholly
exclusive de jure, and will have to be analyzed on that basis.
Anomalies of this kind are not only present in the MedSouth opinion but
also present in the broad body of antitrust doctrine.41 The thing distinguishing
37. MedSouth Staff Opinion, supra note 1.
38. See, e.g., COLLABORATIONS GUIDELINES, supra note 8, at §§ 3.3, 3.34(a); HEALTH
CARE STATEMENTS, supra note 3, at §§ 8(A), 8(B)(2) (different safety zones for exclusive and
non-exclusive ventures and rule-of-reason analysis).
39. MedSouth Staff Opinion, supra note 1.
40. Id.
41. Note, for example, the apparent anomaly that an agreement between two entities not to
compete on a single aspect of competition (like price) will be per se illegal, but a merger that
extinguishes competition entirely is subject to the rule of reason.
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a bare cartel that is per se illegal from a legitimate joint venture is the presence
of some degree of integration, which can potentially yield efficiencies. The
Health Care Statements recognize the efficiency-creating potential of both
financial and clinical integration. An exclusive joint venture would clearly
have more of both. On the other hand, it could raise competitive problems of a
different kind.
V. CONCLUSION
I would like to conclude on a personal note. This article, like a number
that I have written, emphasizes complications and provides more questions
than answers. The reader should not conclude, however, that I disagree with
the MedSouth Staff Opinion or that I believe a subsequent rule-of-reason
inquiry would be too difficult to undertake.
On the contrary, I believe that staff had no choice but to respond as it did.
In California Dental,42 the Supreme Court reaffirmed once more that
government agencies cannot summarily condemn particular practices absent an
extensive body of experience that would indicate they are almost invariably
pernicious. No such experience is available here. Moreover, the MedSouth
proposal is innovative and appears to offer the potential for improved medical
care at lower costs. The venture may not develop that way, but we cannot
strangle it before it has a chance to develop.
Similarly, the discussion of complications and anomalies does not signal
any personal reluctance to proceed further in these matters in order to
determine whether promised performance has been delivered and whether
customers overall have been helped or hurt. In fact, I believe we have an
obligation to do so, lest our integration tests be treated as pure formalities. All
I am saying is that these cases—like so many others that we see—will be
complicated, and decisions will be hard. But, that is what makes this job
interesting.

42. Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 781 (1999).

